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The energy sector is an essential area in Russian-Belarusian relations. Belarus is almost total-
ly dependent on oil and gas supplies from Russia, and preferential prices are necessary for 
Minsk to maintain its outdated economic model and social stability. Russia in turn has used 
the mechanism of subsidising Belarus as a means to bolster its political influence. The disa-
greements between Minsk and Moscow over the rules of co-operation and oil and gas prices 
provoke regular disputes on the subject of energy. 
Over the past few years, the situation in the area of energy co-operation has become more 
strained due to Russia’s desire to optimise the costs of supporting its Belarusian ally alongside 
its growing disappointment with this ally’s disloyalty. This has been accompanied by the es-
calating recession on the Belarusian economy forcing the Belarusian government to apply for 
more and more subsidies. As a result, another Russian-Belarusian energy dispute has been es-
calating since the beginning of 2016, turning into an unprecedentedly long and profound cri-
sis extending over almost all aspects of co-operation between the two countries. In April this 
year, the two parties developed a package of agreements regulating most of the problems, 
most importantly this includes the conditions of oil and gas supplies in the coming years. 
However, in practice, many issues remain unclear, and this creates room for further conflicts. 
Moscow and Minsk are moderately satisfied with the deal and treat it as a temporary compro-
mise. It is clear that the two parties do not trust one another and have conflicting goals. Bela-
rus still hopes for significantly higher subsidies, but is attempting to assert its independence 
in domestic and foreign policy. In turn, the Kremlin, which has been reducing the subsidies, 
would only be ready to increase its support at the price of Minsk becoming unconditionally 
subordinate to Moscow. 
The background of the dispute
The heavy reliance of the Belarusian economy 
on oil and gas supplies from Russia is the source 
of all the Russian-Belarusian oil and gas dis-
putes. Russia supplies 100% of Belarus’s natural 
gas imports. As a result, gas prices are essential 
for the profitability of the predominantly out-
dated industry in Belarus, a section of which 
(for example, nitrate and potassium factories) 
uses it in the production cycle. Russia supplies 
over 90% of the Belarusian consumption of oil. 
Although Belarus has for years extracted around 
1.6 million tonnes of oil annually from its own 
reserves, all of its output is exported, mainly to 
Germany. Belarusian refineries are thus entirely 
dependent on Russian supplies. As recently as 
in 2015, 25% of Belarus’s total export incomes 
were generated by the sale of Belarusian petro-
leum products. As a result, the petrochemical 
sector is of strategic significance for the state 
of the Belarusian economy as a whole. At the 
same time, Belarus, regardless of its numerous 
attempts in the past to diversify the sources of 
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oil and gas supplies, has been unable to find 
an alternative to Russian supplies at an accept-
able price. Furthermore, this seems to be an 
impossible goal in the short and medium term. 
Belarus’s energy dependence on Russia fits in 
the context of the complicated relations be-
tween the two countries in which Moscow 
wishes to completely subordinate Minsk and 
to force it to make strategic concessions em-
phasising its complete loyalty to Moscow. Mos-
cow’s insistence (repeated since autumn 2015) 
on Minsk’s consent to deploy a Russian military 
airbase near Bobruysk serves as one example of 
this. Furthermore, the Kremlin expects Minsk to 
become fully engaged in the process of inte-
gration as part of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) and to back its moves with regard to 
Ukraine. At the same time, Moscow is trying to 
optimise its costs of subsidising the Belarusian 
economy and has been regularly reducing its 
support for Belarus over the past few years (ac-
cording to the International Monetary Fund’s 
report, the value of the subsidies in 2013 was 
equivalent to almost 20% of Belarus’s GDP, 
while in 2015 it was only slightly over 10%)1. 
Meanwhile President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, 
making efforts to receive subsidies at the high-
est possible level, has also been trying to avoid 
making serious political concessions. 
The long road to compromise
The most recent energy dispute began when 
Belarus, referring to its EAEU membership, con-
cluded that it had the right to internal Russian 
prices which were much lower than those of-
1 For more information see: https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16298.pdf 
fered to foreign buyers. As a result, since Jan-
uary 2016, Minsk has paid a price it unilaterally 
reduced to US$80-107 per 1000 m3 for its gas 
supplies instead of US$132–1412 derived from 
the price formula in the binding contract with 
Gazprom. The Russian side did not accept this 
argumentation, and so the debt was accumu-
lating at a regular rate, reaching US$726 million 
by April this year. Russia, in an attempt to force 
Belarus pay this debt, since June 2016 has re-
duced oil supplies to Belarusian refineries from 
the total planned annual volume of 24 million 
tonnes to 18 million tonnes. Although repre-
sentatives of the two countries announced on 
10 October 2016 that a deal had been struck, 
it became clear a few weeks later that the deal 
had not been implemented. Furthermore, more 
issues were added to the catalogue of disa-
greements between Minsk and Moscow, such 
as the status of the border between the two 
countries, border control procedures and ac-
cess to the Russian market for Belarusian food 
products (above all meat and dairy products). 
In addition to this, the Moscow-controlled 
Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Develop-
ment froze further availability of the credit fa-
cility offered to Belarus worth US$2 billion. 
In addition to this, the Russian press has have 
waged an increasingly aggressive propaganda 
campaign since last autumn questioning the 
loyalty of Alyaksandr Lukashenka to his Rus-
sian ally3 and suggesting that this might lead 
to a repeat of the violent Ukrainian scenario in 
Belarus4. The dispute reached its peak when 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, irritated by Moscow’s 
2 After a year or so of the dispute, both Belarus and Russia 
have based their calculations on various rates within the 
indicated price ranges. Regardless of this, a significant 
difference between the calculations made by the two 
parties continued over this entire period. 
3 In Russia’s opinion, Minsk’s policy towards Kyiv has been 
overly neutral and it has refrained from clearly support-
ing the Russian moves against Ukraine, such as the 
annexation of Crimea or supporting the two self-pro-
claimed republics in the Donbas. 
4 For more information see: Kamil Kłysiński, ‘The risk of 
escalating tensions in Minsk-Moscow relations’, OSW 
Analyses, 4 January 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2017-01-04/risk-escalating-ten-
sions-minsk-moscow-relations 
Belarus’s energy reliance on Russia fits 
in with the context of the complicated 
and strained relations between the two 
countries.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 242
confrontational stance, boycotted the summit 
of the leaders of the EAEU and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation on 26 Decem-
ber 2016 in Saint Petersburg. By doing this he 
openly manifested his growing dissatisfaction 
with the lack of the expected benefits from 
the participation in the integration processes 
in the post-Soviet area initiated by Moscow5. 
In effect, Belarus did not sign the Customs 
Code of the EAEU6, which in practice meant it 
blocked an important stage in the process of 
the construction of this integration structure.
All the talks that took place in the first quarter of 
this year were unsuccessful. At the same time, 
the schedule of oil supplies in the first months 
of 2017 suggested that Belarus would receive 
only 16 million tonnes of oil this year, i.e. 2 mil-
lion tonnes less than last year. It appeared then 
that Russia was intentionally delaying resolving 
this conflict while also escalating it in order 
to force the Belarusian government to make 
concessions. The Belarusian side’s stance was 
simultaneously becoming decreasingly flexi-
ble-one manifestation of this was its refusal to 
recognise the existence of the aforementioned 
5 Over the past year or so, the Belarusian president has 
criticised the EAEU (and thus Russia, which dominates 
this structure) in public on numerous occasions for fail-
ing to offer equal conditions to all member states of the 
union. See: Лукашенко вновь раскритиковал ЕАЭС за 
изъятия, ограничения и отсутствие равных условий,   
https://news.tut.by/economics/498581.html; Марина 
Носова, Лукашенко: Давления со стороны России ни 
я, ни белорусы не потерпят, http://naviny.by/article/ 
20160920/1474375596-lukashenko-davleniya-so-sto-
rony-rossii-ni-ya-ni-belorusy-ne-poterpyat
6 This document will replace the Customs Code already 
adopted as part of the Customs Union in 2009.
gas debt7. It was only as a result of the meet-
ing of the presidents of Russia and Belarus on 
3 April in Saint Petersburg that a political deal 
setting the rules of co-operation in the oil and 
gas sector was struck8. 
Belarusian concessions and Russian 
undertakings
The sequence of developments clearly indicates 
that the concessions Belarus made in two dis-
puted issues which Moscow views as funda-
mental is the necessary condition for the imple-
mentation of the political arrangements made 
by the two leaders on 3 April. On 12 April, the 
Belarusian side repaid the debt of US$726 mil-
lion in full. On the same day, Lukashenka signed 
the Customs Code of the EAEU. Two days lat-
er he took part in an informal summit of the 
presidents of the EAEU member states in Bish-
kek, where he did not question the concept of 
Belarus’s further participation in the EAEU9. On 
13 April, the Kremlin agreed to approve a pack-
age of agreements offering Belarus a number 
of the following benefits:  
Firstly, Moscow has agreed to return the volume 
of oil supplies to Belarus to 24 million tonnes 
annually; this level of supplies will be binding up 
to and including 2024. The current schedule of 
quarterly supplies envisages that Russian oil ex-
ports will increase from 4 million tonnes in the 
first quarter of 2017 to 5 million tonnes in the 
second quarter, while in the second half of 2017 
the supplies will reach 15 million tonnes. 
Secondly, the Russian side has agreed to lift 
the obligation for Belarus to supply 1 mil-
7 For more information see: Белоруссия отказалась при-
знавать долг за  газ перед Россией, https://lenta.ru/
news/2017/03/31/belrusgas/ 
8 For more information see: http://kremlin.ru/events/pre-
sident/news/54178  
9 For more information see: Беларусь предлагает ре-
ализовать комплекс действенных мер для более 




The presidents of Russia and Belarus 
struck a political deal at a meeting on 
3 April in Saint Petersburg setting the 
rules of co-operation in the oil and gas 
sector.
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lion tonnes of petroleum products annually 
to Russia. According to the Belarusian dep-
uty prime minister, Uladzimir Semashko, 
Minsk might earn an additional US$150 mil-
lion annually by exporting its own petrole-
um products to more profitable markets10. 
Thirdly, Russia has agreed to offer Belarus 
loans worth a total of US$1.6 billion, including 
US$1 billion directly from Russia and the rest 
from the credit facility offered as part of the Eur-
asian Fund for Stabilisation and Development11. 
Fourthly, it has been finally agreed that Gaz-
prom will reduce the gas price for Belarus in 
2018–2019 by around 20%, i.e. to the level of 
around US$130 per 1000 m3 (according to Dep-
uty Prime Minister Semashko, US$129 per 1000 
m3 in 2018 and US$127 per 1000 m3 in 2019)12. 
Who has won, who has lost?
Even though the list of undertakings regarding 
energy issues is longer on the Russian side, it 
seems that the deals struck are merely an illu-
sory success for Minsk. 
Firstly, it is unclear in what manner the arrange-
ments concerning gas co-operation will final-
ly be implemented. According to assurances 
from Russia, it will supply oil in 2018–2019 on 
10 Белоруссию освободят от обязательных поставок 
бензина в Россию, http://1prime.ru/articles/20170407 
/827341070.html 
11 Россия даст $1 млрд долларов Белоруссии на оплату дол-
га за газ, http://1prime .ru/News/20170410/827345755.
html;  Беларусь получила 300 млн долларов от Ев-
разийского фонда стабилизации и развития, http://
naviny.by/new/20170426/1493213123-belarus-poluchi-
la-300-mln-dollarov-ot-evraziyskogo-fonda-stabilizacii-i 
12 «Газпром» дал скидку Белоруссии, http://www.kom-
mersant.ru/doc/3270189 
conditions that will guarantee a price of around 
US$130 per 1000 m3. This means that the final 
price differs significantly from Belarus’s initial de-
mands (US$72–80 per 1000 m3, and US$100–107 
per 1000 m3 at a later stage of the negotiations). 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the assump-
tions stated in the intergovernmental protocols 
will be put into effect. It can be concluded from 
the arrangements that the guaranteed price will 
be an effect of changes in the price formula in 
the contract between Belarus and Gazprom. The 
three-year Russian-Belarusian contract concern-
ing Russian gas supplies to Belarus will have ex-
pired by the end of 2017, and it is not entirely 
clear whether and to what extent the political 
arrangements will be implemented in the new 
contract. It may also be concluded from press 
reports that a clause enabling the emergence of 
suppliers in Belarus other than Gazprom (along-
side export prices and domestic prices on the 
Russian market being brought to the same level) 
has been removed on the grounds of the proto-
cols signed. This will make it difficult for Belarus 
to diversify gas supplies. 
Secondly, it is not entirely clear in the case of oil 
co-operation how much of the supplied Russian 
oil Belarus will be able to use for manufactur-
ing petroleum products at its own refineries. 
On the one hand, it can be concluded from 
a statement by the Russian minister for ener-
gy, Alexander Novak, that Belarus will be able 
to dispose of the oil supplied by Russia with 
no restrictions13. On the other hand, the Rus-
sian deputy prime minister, Arkady Dvorkovich, 
suggested that only 18 out of the 24 million 
tonnes of oil could be allocated for the needs 
of processing at Belarusian refineries, while the 
remaining 6 million tonnes could only be re- 
-exported. This second variant would de facto 
mean the level of crude oil processing output 
would be maintained on the same level as last 
year, which was around 6 million tonnes low-
13 Новак: Минск сам определит объем переработ-
ки из 24 млн т беспошлинной российской нефти, 
http://1prime.ru/oil/20170414/827367787.html 
Even though the list of concessions regard-
ing energy issues is longer on the Russian 
side, it seems that the deals struck are 
merely an illusory success for Minsk.
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er than in 2015 (i.e. far below the production 
capacity of the modernised Belarusian refin-
eries). The reduction of supplies last year re-
sulted in a US$1.2 billion reduction in revenue 
from the export of petroleum products14 and 
a 19% fall of the oil sector’s output15. At the 
same time, according to calculations by Russian 
experts, at a price of US$55 per barrel, Bela-
rus could earn around US$570 million annually 
on exporting 6 million tonnes of Russian oil. It 
is thus difficult to say that the losses resulting 
from cutting supplies to Belarusian refineries 
will be compensated to a significant extent. 
The Belarusian oil sector will find the successive 
implementation of the so-called ‘tax manoeu-
vre’ in Russia since 1 January 2015 an additional 
challenge. It involves the gradual reduction of 
the export duty on crude oil (from 59% in 2014 
to 30% in 2017), while the production tax rate 
(known as NDPI in Russia) has been growing – 
from 419 roubles per tonne of oil in 2014 to 919 
roubles per tonne in 2017. This means that Be-
larusian refineries are already receiving a more 
expensive raw material, and the higher prices 
are not compensated in this case by Russia’s lift-
ing the export duty on oil. Given this situation, 
the Belarusian government is somewhat dis-
trustful about the negotiated deals and is look-
ing for possibilities to diversify its oil supplies. 
14 For more information see: Газовые бонусы для Бела-
руси: все зависит от мировой цены на нефть, http://
www.belrynok.by/2017/04/18/gazovye-bonusy-dlya-be-
larusi-vse-zavisit-ot-mirovoj-tseny-na-neft/
15 Data on the basis of the official statement from the 
Belarusian company Belneftekhim on the results of its 
operation in 2016. For more information see: «Белне-
фтехим» подвел итоги 2016 года: переработка неф-
ти в минувшем году снизилась на 19%, http://www.
belrynok.by/ru/page/news/4647/
On 5 May this year, the president of the Belaru-
sian oil company Belneftekhim, Ihar Lyashenka, 
announced that talks with “other partners from 
other regions” were underway, but he did not 
precisely state which suppliers he meant16. Fur-
thermore, energy security, including increasing 
exports of Belarusian petroleum products to 
the Ukrainian market, was one of the key issues 
of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s meeting with Presi-
dent Petro Poroshenko on 26 April17. 
Thirdly, it is uncertain when and on what con-
ditions Belarus will receive the loan of US$1 bil-
lion promised during the negotiations in April 
this year. There is no information that any for-
mal deal has been struck regarding this issue. 
Therefore, this is an initial suggestion of a po-
tential loan support at best. It is also unclear 
whether the stabilisation programme of the 
Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Develop-
ment will be continued. The third instalment of 
US$300 million was transferred at the end of 
April this year, even though Belarus had failed 
to meet part of the macroeconomic require-
ments of the fund, was according to a political 
decision by the Kremlin. However, the availabil-
ity of further instalments was conditioned by 
meeting a number of requirements, including 
the launch of the privatisation of state-owned 
industrial facilities on a larger scale18. This is 
a controversial issue for Minsk. Therefore delays 
in transferring the funds from the fund should 
be expected at the least. 
16 For more information see: «Белнефтехим» ведет пере-
говоры по диверсификации поставок нефти, http://
www.belta.by/economics/view/belneftehim-vedet-pe-
regovory-po-diversifikatsii-postavok-nefti-245941-2017/ 
17 For more information see: Беларусь увеличит постав-
ки нефтепродуктов в Украину, заявил Порошенко, 
http://naviny.by/new/20170426/1493223438-belarus-
-uvelichit-postavki-nefteproduktov-v-ukrainu-zayavil-
-poroshenko; Пугало Майдана спрятано. Лукашенко 
и Порошенко пересеклись в зоне, http://naviny.by/ar-
ticle/20170426/1493227891-pugalo-maydana-spryata-
no-lukashenko-i-poroshenko-pereseklis-v-zone
18 For more information see: Минску выставлены новые 
условия получения евразийского кредита, http://navi-
ny.by/article/20170427/1493318497-minsku-vystavleny-
novye-usloviya-polucheniya-evraziyskogo-kredita 
The Belarusian government is somewhat 
distrustful about the negotiated deals and 
is looking for possibilities to diversify its 
oil supplies.
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Conclusions and forecast 
It seems that both presidents have decided to 
strike a deal under the influence of the current 
situation which forces them to make conces-
sions in order to de-escalate the tension which 
is dangerous for the further functioning of the 
present model of co-operation. It may be as-
sumed that the public protests are the main 
factor which has persuaded Lukashenka to 
strike the deal with Russia. For the first time in 
many years these were seen across the country 
and were to a great extent a result of the dissat-
isfaction of ordinary citizens with the long-last-
ing economic recession and the deterioration 
of the living standards it entailed19. Although 
strong reactions from the government led to 
a mitigation in the wave of protests towards 
the end of March, the factors which provoked 
the protests have not been resolved. Given this 
situation, a further escalation of the conflict 
with Russia might lead to a complete economic 
collapse, and thus to the risk of an outburst of 
public dissatisfaction on a scale difficult to cope 
with, even for an authoritarian regime which is 
rather skilful in the use of repression.
Moscow was interested in resolving the dis-
pute on conditions that would on the one hand 
maintain Belarus’s political and economic de-
pendence on Russia, and on the other would 
19 The move which triggered the demonstrations was the 
presidential decree “on counteracting social parasitism”. 
For more information see: Kamil Kłysiński, ‘Demonstrac-
je na Białorusi’, OSW Analyses, 27 March 2017, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-03-27/
demonstracje-na-bialorusi 
not require Russia to incur excessive financial 
costs. Nor should it be ruled out that the Krem-
lin wanted to avoid Minsk blocking the EAEU 
Customs Code from entering into force. For 
Vladimir Putin such a visible failure in the pro-
cess of reintegration of the post-Soviet area 
would be a serious reputation problem in the 
context of the presidential election scheduled 
for next year in Russia. 
The deals have consolidated Belarus’s energy 
dependence on Russia, which is one of the key 
goals of Moscow’s strategy towards Minsk. This 
allows it to successfully use oil and gas as an 
instrument in political relations. In turn, Belarus 
may (assuming that the Kremlin’s measures will 
be fully implemented) at least temporarily sta-
bilise its economic situation. However, it seems 
that neither of the parties has achieved its main 
goal. On the one hand, the level of Russian sup-
plies is much lower than Minsk expected. On 
the other, Belarus has not made any conces-
sions that would be satisfactory to Moscow (for 
example, consent to deploy the military airbase 
near Bobruysk). It should thus be expected that 
the deals will not last long, especially given the 
fact that not all the disputed issues have been 
resolved (the border issue, export of Belarusian 
food products to Russia, etc.). This means that 
a further political crisis with much more serious 
implications for Belarus cannot be ruled out.
